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For the last few decades, considerable attention has been paid to the methodology of mainstream 
economics. It is not mere chance that economics is surrounded by methodological debates. If its 
relevance is at stake, this can be either refuted or proven most effi ciently at a methodological level. 
Arguments for and against mainstream economics underline the methodological homogeneity of 
mainstream economics, while serious, though almost neglected, arguments can be found for a view 
according to which the long history of mainstream economics can be described as a sequence of 
methodological breaks. I argue, fi rstly, for a sharp demarcation by new classical macroeconomics 
from the Friedmanian instrumentalism and, secondly, for the realism of new classicals. I strive to 
identify the epistemological principles underlying Lucas’ models and to highlight the signs of that 
demarcation as well. I concentrate on the techniques by which new classicals could set their models 
into an indirect relationship with reality. It is also highlighted that the common terminology, accord-
ing to which the assumptions of abstract economic models are uniformly regarded as “unrealistic”, 
actually refers to two different techniques. From these approaches, there is only one which can be 
justifi ably labelled as realist.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It has become a common heritage of ours to judge the methodological princi-
ples of mainstream economics through the lens of the seminal paper by Milton 
Friedman (1953), henceforth abbreviated as F53. Over and above the traditional, 
supporting, or conservatively reproving views, a distinct line of enquiry has de-
veloped over time, whose goal is to sort out the contradictions found in the text 
(especially Mäki 2003), or to defend the paper on logical grounds (Boland 1979). 
These efforts will obviously tinge the views on the ground-breaking work (for a 
thematic analysis, see Mäki 2011). It stands to reason, however, that Friedman’s 
paper fundamentally changed the modern forms of economic thought and it is 
still a text about which all of us considering methodological problems should 
unavoidably think something. None of us can be non-committal. 
F53 is often said to have been the trigger for the instrumentalist turn in mod-
ern economics. Even though there have been attempts to re-read the text in a 
realist fashion, it is still the instrumentalist interpretation that seems to be the 
standard reading. A thorough interpretation is hindered by the fact that the text 
abounds in equivocal and nebulous details. Moreover, early on, Friedman himself 
decided not to react to the critiques and the various interpretations, having left 
his standpoint unclarified. Thus, it is no wonder that as a provocative piece of the 
methodological corpus, F53 is still cited, even though more than six decades have 
elapsed since its publication.
Despite its fundamental character, F53 can hardly be said to be a solid and pre-
cise summary of mainstream methodology. In fact, it triggered an epistemologi-
cal break even inside the mainstream camp. For example, mainstream Samuelson 
(1963) was particularly reluctant to accept Friedman’s methodological stance 
labelled as F-twist and made efforts to banish the presumptions that cannot be 
empirically underpinned. In this debate, Samuelson represented a view according 
to which abstract models should be linked to reality. The traditional aversion to 
F53, referring to its instrumentalist character, is rooted somewhere here. It is of 
secondary importance who is right in this controversy since the methodological 
heterogeneity of mainstream economics seems to be evident if we take Samuel-
son’s remarks into accounts. 
In this paper, I try to demonstrate that new classical macroeconomics was a re-
alist movement and it was organised along such purposes that by achieving them 
the traditional opposition of realism and instrumentalism2 could be left behind. 
2  To keep the things as simple as possible, in this paper I use the terms realism and instrumental-
ism in the same meaning as Popper (1963) outlined these concepts. For related considerations, 
see Deichsel (2011) on weak epistemic realism, Mäki (1992) on the different aspects of real-
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First, I emphasise the methodological break between the Friedmanian instru-
mentalism and new classical macroeconomics (Section 1). In Sections 2 and 3, 
I explain why and how economists construct theoretical assumptions in order to 
build realist models and theories. Subsequently, I discuss this methodology in the 
case of new classical macroeconomics (Section 4). Next, the subtle relationship 
between the realist efforts and previous knowledge is detailed in the context of 
explaining realism as discovery and revelation. Here I explain how new classicals 
have shaped reality by their pre-given ideas (Sections 5 and 6). After this, I high-
light the suggested distinction between the two subsets of unrealistic assumptions 
as a final confrontation between the realist and instrumentalist methodologies. 
I think that the epistemological connection between socio-economic reality and 
unrealistic assumptions should always be scrutinised in order to be able to sepa-
rate realist and instrumentalist models from each other (Section 7). Then, turning 
back to new classicals, I explain how new classicals committed to realist efforts 
could construct assumptions in order to have models that support understanding 
and connect them with socio-economic reality (Section 8). 
Economists are normally bound to choose between realism and instrumental-
ism, that is, between ontic relevance and good empirical performance. Accord-
ing to my reasoning, new classical macroeconomics, despite the applied forms 
of abstraction and idealisation, should be regarded as a realist system. These 
researchers definitely broke away from the Friedmanian principles. If I succeed 
in this attempt, the views on the scope of new classical macro would be clearer. 
As my direct purpose here is to scrutinise the way how realism often cited in 
the philosophy of economics is expressed in a well-defined theory, the present 
analysis will hopefully provide some new insights into the role of isolation in 
economic models. 
2. A DUBIOUS CONNECTION
Realism is, by its purpose, successful in supporting our efforts to understand the 
world around us, while it is likely to produce (though not necessarily) models 
whose empirical performance is expected to be weaker. The ultimate reason is 
that such models are abstract and aimed at finding the fundamental economic 
laws or other universal claims and causal generalisations. On the contrary, instru-
isticness, and Hacking (1983) on realism about entities and realism about theories. The latter 
distinction is particularly relevant for our current purposes since I want to call attention to the 
methodological problem of being realist in the second sense by applying unrealistic models 
in the first sense. 
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mentalism concentrates on empirical performance. Understanding, i.e. revealing 
the real causal structure and providing a true picture of reality (Polanyi 1967), 
is not a concern since scientific-theoretical models have nothing to do with the 
relationship between the data and the actuality possibly unapproachable. Accord-
ing to my key message, new classical macroeconomics should be regarded as a 
realist system. It remained a pure theory (i.e. a system based on abstraction and 
idealisation) as defined by neoclassical predecessors, but it did not have to be 
content itself with poor empirical performance, thanks to the considerable devel-
opment of econometric methods in the 20th century. For Lucas, empirical accu-
racy was a high-ranked aspect (De Vroey 2016). On these grounds, processes of 
socio-economic reality could be the touchstone of testing3 a realist theory aimed 
at understanding those processes. New classicals’ ambition was not to provide a 
comprehensive realist description of reality, but to construct a conventional ab-
stract realist theory and a family of models that were able to explain actual proc-
esses with a considerable degree of numerical accuracy. In the new classical case, 
confronting realism and instrumentalism as a compromise is completely useless 
and makes no sense at all.
However, authors often neglect to draw a distinct line between Friedmanian 
monetarism and new classicals in methodological terms. What is more, some 
critics make the mistake of gathering arguments against F53 partly from Lucas’ 
island models4 (Syll 2010). Such a direct relationship seems to be dubious, even 
considering the fact that one can hardly find any references to F53 in any of the 
important works by Lucas or other leading new classicals. These impressions are 
further strengthened by the fact that Neil Wallace referred to Friedman’s influ-
ence on Lucas and on him as extremely troublesome (Hoover – Young 2011: 9). 
And, since I have just mentioned the island models, it also has to be stressed that 
Lucas regarded Samuelson (1958), who had a sharp aversion to the methodologi-
cal principles of Friedman, as his direct intellectual predecessor. These papers 
were born on a day and in an age when F53 was also available to Lucas.5 
3 In a strict sense, testing here means falsificationally testing in a Popperian way.
4  The term “island models” refer to those works of Lucas in which he laid the theoretical foun-
dations of new classical macroeconomics and paved the way for further research into the 
nature of the relationship between inflation and real economic performance. These are the 
models by which Lucas could clarify the circumstances under which economic policy can be 
efficient.
5  It seems to be a further important detail that Tom Sargent (1987) gave a brief summary on 
how Milton Friedman had contributed to the development of modern theoretical macroeco-
nomics. Friedman’s methodological recommendations were not even mentioned in his list, al-
though in other aspects he reported a vivid connection between Friedman and his disciples. 
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3. ASSUMPTIONS SUPPORTING REALISM
The charge of instrumentalism always means that a criticised theory is not rel-
evant in terms of understanding reality (Nagel 1963: 218). This is exactly the 
aspect in which realist theories are outstanding. It is interesting and important to 
realise that in his Nobel lecture, Lucas (1995) mentioned the word “understand-
ing” right in the first sentence. Such phrasings can help us refer to new classical 
macro as a realist system. The new classicals seem to have broken with their 
predecessors for the sake of understanding. For them, the prior model structures 
were unable to support the understanding of the processes experienced in ac-
tual macro-systems (Hoover – Young 2011: 14–15). Frank Hahn (1971: 61–62) 
charged Friedman exactly with the lack of a solid theoretical background and, as 
a consequence, making without proper understanding some ungrounded statisti-
cal inferences. Just to shed light on this statement: Hahn did not put the blame 
for the empirical underpinning of a theory with doubtful data on Friedman, but 
emphasised that Friedman had regarded the highlighting of an unclarified econo-
metrical relationship as a theory. Detecting the mere fact of econometric anteri-
ority does not substitute for theory-based understanding. Understanding always 
means the understanding of the actual causal structures (Kitcher 1989; Hausman 
2009). In Lucas’ (1977: 26) words, “it is not enough to believe oneself to be right, 
one must be able to explain why one is right”. 
Any kind of accordance with reality can be grounded at two levels, namely 
at the level of assumptions or the level of consequences. As we have just seen, 
explanation and understanding can be referred to as finding the causes, that is, an-
swering the whys (Hausman 2009: 49). If we believe that the regularities experi-
enced in actual societies can be traced back to well-circumscribed causes, we can 
understand how these causes contribute to the emergence of the outcomes con-
sequences by isolating these causes (Hindriks 2013). The empirical performance 
is expected to be rather weak, mainly due to the combination of abstraction and 
idealisation. The real causal structure is simplified, as we only focused on the con-
sequences of some causes. Of course, one should not forget about the effect of the 
development of modern econometric methods on theoretical economics. It was 
exactly the new classical school whose members could successfully overcome the 
previous compromise between truth and accuracy. Prior to the econometrically 
well-educated new classicals, economists had already been able to construct real-
ist models whose empirical performance was quite good (De Vroey 2016: 50–51). 
In other words, the way was paved for the successful empirical application of pure 
theory. Actually, this is the reason why it is difficult to argue for the realism of the 
new classical macroeconomics. These models, applied to particular types of data, 
were considerably accurate, which puts them in the shade of instrumentalism.
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The programme of instrumentalist economics, as a heritage of positivism 
(Polanyi 1967, 1972), is lacking in the effort of explanation and understanding, 
which is replaced by a sole focus on empirical performance. This is the case of 
the assumption of rational utility-maximising leaves on a tree or the also oft-cited 
mere empirical correlation between the numbers of new-born babies and storks. 
Specifically, in the latter example, we have nothing more than a plain empirical-
statistical relationship within a dataset. As far as any of the above examples are 
considered, we can hardly get closer to the understanding of the experienced phe-
nomena of central interest (the density of the leaves or the dynamics of births). 
Realist models always have a substantial advantage over the instrumentalist con-
structions. They are considered to be true as genuine conjectures (Popper 1963: 
154). That is, in their partiality, these models can be believed to contain both the 
truth, but not the whole truth, and some details that cannot be found in reality in 
the form the models show. On the contrary, instrumentalist models can be handy 
systems with formal benefits at best (Polanyi 2005: 143). In his paper of primary 
importance, Daniel Hausman (1981), citing John Stuart Mill, successfully calls 
our attention to the fact that since the neoclassical era it has been the heritage of 
theoretical economics to aspire to the revelation of the real causal structure in-
stead of highlighting mere statistical correlations.6 
4. CONSTRUCTING REALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS
However, Lucas gave a great example how an economist makes intellectual ef-
forts to interpret empirical observations on the basis of a theory. He started from a 
hypothesis, which was almost a commonplace at that time: real output level does 
not respond to inflation dynamics (Lucas 1972: 103). In other words, for Lucas, 
there existed a natural level or rate of real variables, which definitely was a rea-
soning of theoretical quality underlying his interpretation. Lucas’ phrasing else-
where (Lucas 1973: 326) clearly conveys the idea that there is a solid theoretical 
foundation (i.e. the natural rate theory) from which such mathematical expressions 
and such restrictions of the output-inflation relationship can be derived that can be 
directly tested in econometric terms. The theoretical foundation Lucas provided 
puts our focus on the mechanism according to which agents acting on separated 
markets do not have enough information as to the relevant prices. Postulating this 
6  Milton Friedman’s expectations-augmented Phillips curve precisely reflects the instrumental-
ist model-building philosophy. It is exactly the set of problematic presumptions of why the 
Friedmanian interpretation of the Phillips curve does not yield general conclusions (Galbács 
2015: 153–167).
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mechanism that originally comes from Hayek7 is similar to the case when the rela-
tionship between price and supply/demand is scrutinised in the Marshallian cross. 
Lucas defined an environment in which the agents forming rational expectations 
are not able to distinguish the relative and the absolute price changes. This is the 
system which was built to support the consideration of the macroeconomic effects 
of information deficiencies. The whole system was designed in order to highlight 
this mechanism. The theoretical basis in the background is that information defi-
ciencies affect macro economic performance (Lucas 1975: 1120). In Mäki’s (1994: 
244) words, this is a core assumption, while the allocation mechanism designed to 
emphasise it is only a peripheral assumption of marginal importance. The given 
procedure in which the agents get to the islands is unessential since the model ac-
cents a given aspect of reality and it is not required to describe how this feature has 
taken shape. 
Admittedly, it is not easy to argue for an interpretation according to which the 
rational economic agent applied by the new classicals through as-if assumptions 
is not the product of an instrumentalist model-building strategy, similarly to the 
Friedmanian as-if-type rational leaves. It is particularly true of the as-if-type as-
sumptions that they do not imply any valid existential (i.e. descriptive) assertions. 
Actual entities never look exactly like these presumptions. Models of both Fried-
man and Lucas abound in such assumptions. According to the traditional neoclas-
sical methodology (Weber 1978: 20–22), the analysis of the causal structure can 
be performed at two distinct levels: one is the level of the ideal-typical mecha-
nisms highlighted in the model itself, and the other is the understanding of the 
discrepancies between the model and reality. Here I am stating that new classicals 
have strongly insisted on this tradition of causal analysis, while Friedmanian in-
strumentalism has abandoned this principle. Having done so, Friedmanian instru-
mentalism produced models of dubious value in terms of causal understanding.8 
So, on second thoughts, the difference is dramatic. We have to realise here that 
new classicals consistently applied the neoclassical technique of conceptualising 
and model-building. This technique involves not only the traditional (neoclassi-
cal) way of isolation, but also the use of equation systems. In these systems, new 
classicals made the inaccuracy of the neoclassical deterministic equations ex-
plicit by building white-noise error terms (Spanos – Mayo 2015: 3534). The idea 
of the rational economic man, and this is the fundament of my present reasoning, 
is built from actually existing features shaped through properly applied abstrac-
tion and idealisation. Homo oeconomicus is per definitionem the economic man. 
His assumed behaviour reflects the patterns that all of us would show if we were 
7 It was one of my referees who called my attention to this interesting intellectual relationship.
8 Section 7 is completely devoted to covering this idea.
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no more than rational utility-maximising economic individuals. Some character-
istics of our personalities or some effects of our social environment disturb these 
pure rational behavioural patterns (Hausman 1981: 365). That is, the behaviour of 
actual economic agents is likely to reflect certain effects in addition to economic 
rationality. This is exactly the reason why Hausman (1992) refers to the funda-
mental economic laws as tendency laws. Such laws manifest themselves as mere 
tendencies in actual behaviour. Perhaps the most effective argument for realism 
is to highlight that although our fundamental economic laws only show up as 
tendencies in the actual socio-economic processes, these laws can and should be 
regarded as universally true. It is due to the fact that if a law spans a wide range of 
patterns of human behaviour being as different as possible and explains them as 
their common underlying core, then this law must evidently be devoid of content 
and vague in its manifestation (Weber 1904). Each of us is partly an economic 
man, and partly a lot of else. Through isolation one can ignore these further effects 
(Lucas 1972: 105), which are said to be irrelevant to economics, but nevertheless 
may be highly important in an institutional aspect. In abstraction the theoriser de-
taches them,9 then in idealisation one exaggerates the remaining, relevant features 
to extremity. The behaviour of the homo oeconomicus is subordinated to the sole 
purpose of utility-maximising (Lucas 1980: 701). In these theorising techniques, 
however, we do not attribute anything to human beings that they do not possess 
as factual features: abstraction means disregarding something, while idealisation 
means exaggerating other (i.e. the remaining) characteristics. Neither of these 
procedures adds any actually non-existing features. The concept of the rational 
leaf, however, is not like this. In this case, a feature not pertaining to actual leaves 
is made exclusive. Economic agents forming rational expectations are burdened 
with the signal processing problem. In the island models that marvellously cap-
ture the isolated character of actual markets, it is exactly the signal processing 
problem that manifests the information deficiency – the information deficiency 
which is the basis of the business cycles in the new classical theory. 
5. REALISM AND UNDERSTANDING IN THE NEW CLASSICAL WAY
The difference between a realist and an instrumentalist researcher is not the ex-
plicit reference to empirical performance. The real difference involves under-
standing and the ambition to understand. It is natural that a realist does not ignore 
the empirical performance of his model either, since the success of a realist model 
9  On that omission, that is, leaving something out is an evident part of building abstract models 
(Lucas 1980: 700). 
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built through isolation can be well underpinned by this efficiency (Mäki 2009: 
81). It is typical, for example, that Lucas modified his first two island models 
in order to make the resulting system (Lucas 1975) consistent with the common 
view of actually long-lasting business cycles (Hoover – Young 2011: 25). It was 
the view with which the white noise business cycles of the earlier versions could 
not harmonise in any way (or only very indirectly). Thus, in this case, the modi-
fication of the theory was necessitated by the interest of creating a higher degree 
of concordance with reality.
A realist, per definitionem, builds up his model from certain selected parts of 
reality, so a good empirical performance somehow implies that through the phe-
nomena they guide one can observe the fundamental laws he wants to highlight. 
There can arise certain circumstances under which the stochastic contingencies 
on the whole do not disturb the functioning of the comprehensive laws depicted 
in the model. The way Lucas (1977: 16) regarded the paper co-authored with 
Rapping (Lucas – Rapping 1969a) as an empirical corroboration of the theoreti-
cal considerations strengthens this view.10 It is true that the lack of good empiri-
cal performance in the realist case does not lead to the failure of the theory or a 
model (Polanyi 1972). Rather, it seems to be the more general case that a realist 
pure theory cannot be submitted to falsifying tests, at least not in a sensible way, 
due to the distance it lies from reality. Even if it is the case, a realist still scruti-
nises reality, possibly lacking in empirical corroboration. A realist is interested in 
revealing the deep and fundamental factors, in discovering the ultimate causes. 
Good empirical performance, in this respect, is of secondary importance, though 
it is admittedly a corroborating circumstance (or, specifically, an important falsi-
fying test), which relates to the (direct) practical applicability of the theory and 
a model rather than to the truth of the model (Hausman 1981: 374). On the con-
trary, an instrumentalist solely concentrates on empirical performance, ignoring 
the causal structure. 
Thus, it is not something weird if a realist also pays attention to the consistency 
between the actually observed phenomena on one hand, and the outcomes gener-
10  When Lucas mentions systematic evidence at the aggregate level, his phrasing clearly reflects 
that economists want to acquire knowledge of reality through a theoretical model. Good em-
pirical performance of an instrumentalist model does not prove anything beyond this good 
empirical performance. Of course, it has to be noted that Lucas highlights here the feature of 
the model as a merit that it leads to the same outcome as the one that is experienced in the 
course of actual macroeconomic cycles. In this case, we face the efforts according to which an 
otherwise abstract realist model is required to describe the actual socio-economic processes 
with quite a good empirical performance. These ambitions, I think, are primarily limited to 
new classical macroeconomics, and one should not regard them as a universal motive within 
the mainstream theory of realist traditions.
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ated by his model on the other hand. He can gain important support from such 
consistency. But how can one know in the case of realist models without easily 
interpretable empirical underpinning whether the idea underlying the model is 
correct and relevant? We can refer to commitment, which was somehow a guar-
antee for Polanyi (2005), and which means that the researcher explicitly under-
takes the revelation of the real causal structure. Alternatively, we can mention the 
societal nature of creating knowledge, through which the overlapping generations 
of researchers concede the reliable and reject the ambiguous results, while build-
ing upon the ever-renewing and refined-improved findings (Polanyi 1970). Here, 
we can also highlight the strong requirement according to which a researcher 
must always be able to account for the discrepancy between the outcomes of an 
intended-to-be-realist model and the actually experienced reality. And, moreover, 
we should not forget about the circumstance that without commitment to realism, 
mere empirical performance becomes of dubious value since even horoscopes 
can be underpinned with observations (Polanyi 2005: 177).
It is of primary importance to see that referring to empirical performance, in 
itself, does not make anybody an instrumentalist. A realist is engaged in under-
standing reality, so it is not surprising at all if under specific circumstances real-
ity directly reflects his isolation-based model and if he rejoices at that. Realist 
models built on the act of isolation always mimic reality with respect to some 
characteristics that the researcher takes as relevant. The simplest economic mod-
els and the most sophisticated theories are all the same in this regard. There are 
phenomena, mechanisms, features, etc. in reality, which are of marginal impor-
tance as to the problem under study, no matter how interesting they may be in 
other aspects. So the researcher simply leaves them out of his model or theory 
(Lucas 1977: 17). Abstraction on its own does not force an economist to be anti-
realist. Without explicitly citing the Weberian style of idealisation, Lucas gave 
here a marvellous description of that. Although real wages are not constant over a 
business cycle, they do not change in a consistently pro- or countercyclical way. 
As a consequence, it would make no sense to attribute a central role to real wage 
dynamics in the understanding of business cycles. Thus, it is more convenient to 
take these wages as constant. In his island models, Lucas similarly accentuated 
the characteristics of actual macro-economies, according to which the complete 
system of prices cannot be observed, so experiencing the changes in prices may 
be erroneous. Abstraction and idealisation are carried out so that the mechanism 
we believe to be relevant could be put into focus. In the case of the island mod-
els, it is exactly the signal processing problem that was presupposed to trigger 
macro-cycles. 
It is more interesting to call attention to the circumstance that an instrumental-
ist always applies to reality in order to confirm his “theory”. Without such a direct 
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turn to actuality, an instrumentalist system would never make any sense. At the 
same time, a realist theory (without quotation-marks) does not necessarily require 
something like this. However, due to the grounding isolation starting from actual-
ity and due to the apodicticity of mathematics, a realist model can convey some 
truth about reality even without requiring confirmation from experience. Should 
reality confirm a given theory, it is only an additional source of pleasure. 
However, Lucas presented the good empirical performance of a realist model 
supporting our understanding as an explicit requirement. As we have just seen, 
he had already moved in this direction with his 1975 island model (Lucas 1975). 
Here, generally speaking, Lucas is claiming that a good theory must provide us 
with answers to the whys underlying the empirical phenomena. For example, why 
the easily distinguishable negatively sloped short-run Phillips curve shifts verti-
cally according to the detailed empirical data. On the basis of the theory, one must 
draw inferences that are in harmony with some well-known phenomena. Taking 
the intentions of understanding into account, this is the combination of realism 
and empirical performance. According to its own intentions, new classical macr-
oeconomics was organised as a realist system that was placed on solid microfoun-
dations and had remarkable empirical performance. On the basis of its applied 
methodology, however, new classical macro has remained a pure theory all along 
(see Chapter 2 of Keynes 1936), and being so, it has not been required to give 
a comprehensive realistic description of our socio-economic reality (Hoover – 
Young 2011: 37). Due to the high degree of abstraction, new classical models 
could hardly be regarded as steps towards a comprehensive realistic description 
of reality, which, by the way, would make no sense at all (Lucas, Various. Box 13, 
Directions of Macroeconomics folder, 1979). Replacing the omniscient neoclas-
sical representative agent with the Lucasian islanders forming rational expecta-
tions, of course, can be interpreted as a significant step in a de-idealising strategy, 
similarly to the way the island models put our focus on the dispersed character 
of information. The standard neoclassical markets and the information available 
there would not have made it possible to make room for macroeconomic cycles 
while postulating rational agents (Lucas 1975: 1114–1120). However, the de-
velopment of econometric methods enabled economists to endow their abstract 
models with a considerable degree of explanatory power. In the new classical 
case, good empirical performance was also strengthened by the special interpre-
tation of the theory as a positive heuristic. 
Firstly, individual expectational errors are offset at the aggregate level and, 
secondly, expectations get “anchored” by some institutions in a central position 
announcing certain data and forecasts. These theorising techniques successfully 
bolstered the theory, while the as-if clauses often applied in the first versions 
could be set aside. In any case, theory performed quite well when compared with 
268 PÉTER GALBÁCS
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
the empirical facts. This is exactly the feature that gives new classical theory an 
outstanding importance in the history of economic thought. Thanks to the sys-
tem of presumptions applied and the improved econometric methods, economists 
were able to construct an abstract-realist theory and a family of models that could 
perform well on the data.
Good empirical performance in new classical models is underpinned, for ex-
ample, by the precise clarification of the relationship between the concepts used 
and the factual data. We are given a clear-cut description of this technique in 
Lucas – Rapping (1969b). An index was introduced, which was calculated on 
the basis of the actual and normal labour supply. In its content and distribution 
characteristics, this index was found to be close to the official rate of unem-
ployment. The only problem was that the official unemployment rate and the 
index Lucas and Rapping calculated were not exactly the same regarding their 
contents. Certain groups of women and young people were supposed not to be 
ready for reporting themselves as unemployed and, moreover, the normal labour 
supply defined by Lucas and Rapping did not contain the frictional component. 
However, the authors draw the inference from the data available that these two 
variables (i.e. the actually measured rate and the theoretical index) were linearly 
correlated, so it seemed to be possible and sensible to test their model on the data. 
Conclusions drawn from the theoretical model could be directly compared with 
the observations because their relationship was clarified enough. Although Lucas 
and Rapping here referred to the empirical performance, this technique of theirs 
did not involve the instrumentalist way of conceptualisation.
6. REALISM: DISCOVERY AND REVELATION
It may go without saying that a model does not help us to understand the causal 
structure of the problem under study. The purpose of a realist economist is to 
draw inferences about the highlighted aspects of socio-economic reality. The 
causal structure is at hand when he is about to construct his theory or model. 
This characteristic is brilliantly highlighted in the philosophy of Michael Polanyi 
on the basis of episodes from the history of the natural sciences. A model only 
reveals, highlights, and represents the presupposed causal relations in action. It is 
not an overstatement to say that the conclusions drawn by the economist (or the 
majority of them at least) are ready before the underlying model or theory is 
born. In the new classical case, specifically, insufficient information about price 
dynamics may lead to business cycles – so models are designed in order that 
these desired and requested conclusions could actually be drawn. Whether this 
postulated mechanism is relevant as to the actual processes and the understanding 
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of reality, whether it is able to explain the Phillips curve shown up as a mere em-
pirical regularity (Lucas 1972: 122) or not depends on whether we are able to link 
this mechanism to our socio-economic reality through further assumptions. If so, 
the model can give us good theoretical explanations for some empirical observa-
tions (e.g. business cycles). In a properly defined model environment, the agents 
isolated from the idea of actual economic actors will produce the outcomes which 
can be experienced in reality and highlighted with econometric methods through 
the postulated mechanism (Lucas 1972: 103–104). In these terms, assumptions 
are far more important than Friedman (1953) thought. Regardless of whether a 
postulated mechanism actually contributes to the events of the surrounding so-
cial reality or not, a model can only confirm it if that model leads to conclusions 
analogous to the actual processes on the basis of the assumptions that must not be 
regarded as limiting factors for the generalisation of our results. 
It has to be noted that reduction belongs to both the instrumentalist and the re-
alist procedures (Patton 2015: 3446). This is evident in the realist case. Phenome-
na experienced at the market level are traced back to the assumed and highlighted 
regularities of the individual’s behaviour. An instrumentalist does the same. The 
difference (and this is crucial!) lies in the nature of the underlying assumptions. 
Friedman (1953), through a reduction, traced the aggregate behaviour of leaves 
back to their presumed individual characteristics, which are obviously non-ex-
istent in reality. Since reduction always manifests itself in the unifying act of 
tracing something back to a common fundament (e.g. phenomenon, law, etc.), the 
demarcation line between realism and instrumentalism stems from the nature of 
this common basis. A realist links his model and theory to reality through the acts 
of proper abstraction and idealisation, whereby he ensures that reduction supports 
explanation and understanding. In order to do so, Lucas (1977: 16) chooses an 
everyday economic agent, describes his daily activities and the way he leads his 
life, then gives quite a detailed list of his characteristics and activities, which are 
omitted from the given theoretical framework. The description of investment and 
expectations here is as real as if it was from a practical management handbook 
(Lucas 1977: 23). The picture Lucas paints about the individual giving the basis 
for the new classical models is the alter ego of the Weberian ideal type, now 
dressed in a mathematical guise and given the task of doing something else than 
before. The Lucasian islands are populated by the generations of the counterparts 
of the representative individual, who, within a generation, are completely identi-
cal to each other regarding their relevant characteristics – while they do not have 
any irrelevant features at all. This picture of the identical economic agents is the 
result of isolation, the same as the concept of the physical point. We can wit-
ness the same when Robert Shiller depicts the new modelling standard set off by 
the rational expectations hypothesis as it had specific ideas about the underlying 
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structure that generates the observations. According to that, economic agents have 
tastes and technology, and they have trade-offs built into the preference systems. 
This is the micro-structure on which the macro-system is placed, in which the 
utility-maximising behaviour of the agents depends on their expectations (Hoo-
ver – Young 2011: 30–31). It is not too hard to realise that this is also an aspect of 
our socio-economic reality. Experienced macroeconomic phenomena should be 
traced back to the regularities of the representative individual’s behaviour. This 
effort has been typical of some particular chapters of mainstream economics, 
including the majority of the microfoundations projects that follow the Walra-
sian maxims. Both realism and instrumentalism rest on a particular strategy of 
choosing and designing the assumptions. The reduction-based understanding of 
our reality is only possible when the assumptions we apply and the models built 
on them are all linked to reality. Otherwise, we can only have some empirical 
regularities and correlations. In the case of instrumentalist models, applying the 
principle of reduction does not imply the act of understanding.
7. REALISM AND PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE
A realist researcher is driven by the desire to understand reality (Mäki 2009: 
74). In these efforts, however, his personal involvement is considerably strong. 
We have to keep this in mind in order that a mere superficial contradiction could 
be swept away once and for all. When designing and accomplishing realist ab-
straction and idealisation, a researcher follows his own judgements, interests, 
and beliefs, and he definitely requires his results claimed to be of universal im-
portance to reveal the hidden ontic structure of reality (Polanyi 2005: 328–329; 
Deichsel 2011: 26). This is the reason why the realism of models and theories is 
not the question of evidence and empirical performance. In order to make that 
comprehensible through his concepts and theories, a researcher approaches real-
ity knowing in advance what he will find there and what he wants to highlight 
through revelations.11 Of course, there is a preceding belief according to which 
there is something out there to look for. It is not only the firm belief in the ex-
istence of our social and physical reality, but also the belief in the presence of 
11  For Lucas (1995: 251–252), such previous knowledge was how he inferred the consecutive 
shifts of the short-run Phillips curve from the data. Similar previous knowledge was the pos-
tulation of economic agents who form expectations or the presumption that these expectations 
are crucial to their behaviour. His question of fundamental importance was how the agents 
possessing insufficient information respond to price changes on isolated markets, while ac-
cording to the presumptions, past experience on price dynamics constantly builds into the 
expectations (see Hoover – Young 2011: 11–16, for a more detailed discussion). 
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regularities and laws underlying this reality that can be described in scientific 
terms. For Lucas (1977: 22), such a belief was, for example, how he described 
the adjustment processes that trigger temporary real effects and diffuse through 
the economy before a general increase in the price level occurs. There was a 
similar previous belief that the source of business cycles is the change in the 
quantity of money (although the empirical evidence was weak, he kept on believ-
ing this), or that the government have a limited countercyclical potential (Lucas 
1977: 25). Lucas thought the signal processing problem to be the summary of 
the mechanism he wanted to emphasise as the source of business cycles, and he 
carried out the isolation so that this mechanism could actually be the trigger for 
macro-cycles in his models. 
This is the way how discovery and revelation work. Neither of them, of course, 
is an infallible procedure, which makes the broadening and changing of knowl-
edge a partly collective act due to the need of public admittance (see, for ex-
ample, Barnes et al. 2002). Being a realist, one can only highlight something 
through isolation that is previously known or believed to be out there. What we 
are looking for is thought to be there, pre-given in actuality, and will even some-
how become “visible” through our revelation. Weber did not attribute real exist-
ence to the ideal types he suggested as the instrument of understanding. Such a 
“minimalistic” ideal type as the homo oeconomicus (Angner 2015: 3558), who 
populates the Lucasian islands together with his alter egos, helps us to reach the 
essential and fundamental structure of reality. It is a level of actuality that is hid-
den behind the disturbing appearances of our socio-economic world and that is 
unlikely to be directly perceived (Polanyi 1964, 1966). Whether it is an econo-
mist or a natural scientist in search of fundamental laws, he will apply them to a 
simplified idea of reality, which is able to highlight only those relationships we 
are keenly interested in. 
An actually non-existing idea connects with an item of reality that is present in 
the surrounding world since such an idea reflects something that is actually out 
there but, at the same time, hidden behind the complexity of our world. Polanyi 
could successfully explain this activity of a scientific researcher on the basis of 
Gestalt psychology. The researcher actually starts to consider the isolated phe-
nomena as parts of some complex totality (Polanyi 1972) and, through his theory, 
he wants to capture this objectively existing totality. So, realist abstract models 
do reveal something, but do not create anything. Such a model or theory is a 
revelation of something which is out there, but whose manifestations are often 
disturbed by the contingencies of our actuality, and which is difficult to highlight 
and capture in its essence without omitting those contingencies. Realist models 
are necessarily of simplifying character.
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8. UNREALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS IN A TWO-FOLD ROLE
As reduction is applied both in the realist and the instrumentalist models, it is 
similarly true that both families are built on assumptions not having actual exist-
ence, whether the core or the peripheral assumptions are considered (Mäki 1994). 
It is often isolation that makes up the fundament of model-building in both cases, 
even though following different principles (Ibid., p. 341). It is common that there 
is no real existence (Mäki 1992: 317), and thus these assumptions cannot capture 
reality in its totality. That is, they should all be regarded as unrealistic. However, 
realist and instrumentalist models make very different claims on economists. In 
his methodological paper, Friedman (1953: 8) called attention to the idea that the 
assumptions of a good theory would fall considerably far from reality (Friedman 
1953: 14).12 This is true: but it is also true, though in a different way, of the realist 
models in which empirical performance was originally of marginal importance. 
We have seen that the most universal laws and the assumptions capturing the 
common cores of different kinds of things stand the farthest from the totality of 
our reality. We have a similar setting in the case of the assumptions underlying a 
realist model and their descriptive relevance. Instrumentalist assumptions are also 
unrealistic, but in their case, there is no abstraction or idealisation as the act of 
connecting with reality. Isolation starting out from existing things and features is 
replaced by some pragmatist considerations. Although both idealisation (as exag-
gerating some characteristics) and abstraction (as omitting some actually existing 
features) seem to be in the game, there is no ambition to connect the model with 
reality. Picking out the assumptions is driven by the utility which arises from the 
empirical performance of the models built on them. The unrealisticness of instru-
mentalism and the unrealisticness of realism are of completely different nature. 
Assumptions applied in realist models have no descriptive relevance either. How-
ever, the methodology by which these assumptions are created is not of marginal 
importance. Through isolation, we can get presumptions that can capture some 
significant elements of reality, even if they cannot reflect their totality. 
The relationship between instrumentalism and abstraction needs a careful 
analysis. This demand even highlights the fact that mainstream economics has 
not been uniform in methodological terms and neither did Friedman suggest and 
12  This is why interpreting F53 is problematic, since the quoted passages seem to support even 
a realist standpoint. The key to a grounded interpretation and to settling the realist vs. instru-
mentalist debate, I think, is to be found in those parts where Friedman stresses the empirical 
performance of models, and where he illustrates his requirements on assumptions through his 
idea of rational leaves. These paragraphs are emphasised here when arguing for Friedman’s 
instrumentalism because the further elements cited above likewise support the realist stand-
point, so they do not help us to decide. 
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follow a unique principle. The instrumentalist vision of rational utility-maxim-
ising leaves is not based on abstraction since all the relevant features come from 
artificial and goal-oriented alchemy (that is, something is assumed which is not 
present in reality, not even as a clue; see Shech 2015: 3477), while the details 
bearing a resemblance to the real counterparts (Friedmanian leaves are also likely 
to be green) are completely irrelevant with regard to the problem under study. On 
the contrary, an expectations-augmented Phillips curve is based on dubious ab-
straction. Even though the idea of actual economic agents was the starting point, 
several relevant features of hardly marginal importance were omitted. However, 
the main purpose here was to properly ground a demanded conclusion. What is 
the lesson to learn? The instrumentalist strategy does not lead to understanding 
in either case, since we could not get closer to the real causal structure.13 There is 
only a thin line between the ways realists and instrumentalists utilise abstraction, 
since, first, all relevant characteristics have to be assumed away in order to be 
able to add the non-existing features. 
Here, I am stating that a presumption that is created from reality through ab-
straction and idealisation should not be regarded as unrealistic. In such a case, 
the given assumption does not contradict reality, even if it has no real existence 
in empirical terms, and is therefore not real. Although the terminology in current 
use uniformly labels the assumptions of theoretical models as “unreal”, it has to 
be stressed that this terminology assigns the scrutinised elements of both the in-
strumentalist and the realist models into the same set. Mäki (1992: 320) discusses 
the realism of models in three senses, extendable to the assumptions. Referential 
realism means that a theoretical construction refers to actually existing things; 
representational realism means that it represents features its real referents actual-
ly have; while veristic realism means that it truly reflects the features of the things 
it represents. Mäki (1992: 329) also stressed that abstraction-idealisation-based 
13  It has to be noted in Friedman’s defence that he seems to have taken some steps towards real-
ist models. The agents optimising over a long time-horizon in his permanent income hypothe-
sis (PIH) should be regarded as such efforts at least. In this case, Friedman himself appears to 
have abandoned the instrumentalism of F53. However, these results are fraught with the same 
difficulties of the problematic abstraction as his adaptive expectations hypothesis (AEH). 
All in all, it was the characteristic that later led PIH specified within the rational expectation 
hypothesis (REH) to success. These considerations may support the view that underlines the 
methodological heterogeneity of Friedman (Mäki 2003). Going farther along these lines, on 
some occasions Friedman (2009: 229) definitely preferred understanding to mere empirical 
correlations: “However consistent may be the [mere empirical] relation between monetary 
change and economic change and however strong the [empirical] evidence for the autonomy 
of monetary changes, we shall not be persuaded that the monetary changes are the source of 
the economic changes unless we can specify in some detail the mechanism that connects the 
one with the other.”
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assumptions of realist economic models are referentially and representationally 
realistic, while they violate veristic realism. It is exactly the characterisation we 
need in order to be able to separate the assumptions of instrumentalist models 
which are said to be false-unreal in all three aspects from the assumptions of the 
realist models, which are referentially and representationally realistic. 
9. THE CASE OF NEW CLASSICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
By now it should go without saying that the ultimate purpose of creating real-
ist abstract models is to understand objectively existing reality. So these models 
should definitely be regarded as surrogate, but not as substitute systems. Accord-
ing to my reasoning, new classicals shared this ambition. This reasoning is placed 
on the review of (1) the purposes and (2) the methodology of new classicals. 
Both elements are necessary since the implementation may be wrong, making the 
realist program miss the mark, even if the purpose of realism is clearly present 
in the texts. Here, for example, we can refer to the case of the simple rules useful 
to operative economic policy. Admittedly, setting up such rules does not neces-
sarily require us to understand the causal structure. The Phillips curve could be 
interpreted as a simple empirical correlation. Governments do not demand infla-
tion dynamics or the relationship between actual inflation and expectations to 
affect the unemployment rate in reality. The rule is still available and useful even 
without understanding the whys, i.e. learning the real causal structure (see Hoo-
ver 2015: 3510, for further considerations). The requirement regarding economic 
models formulated by Lucas (1980: 696), according to which they should serve 
as artificial economic systems (i.e. laboratories) in order to help us to evaluate the 
effects of certain economic policy steps, could even be met by an instrumentalist 
model. Here, Lucas noted that the expected reactions of actual macroeconomic 
systems should never be mistaken for the factually known responses of model 
economies. The realism of economic models does not make it possible to directly 
apply our model-based conclusions to our socio-economic reality since models 
never reflect total reality. The first paragraph of this paper is perhaps the most 
important methodological manifesto of his life. 
Some of Lucas’ papers that are the most important in methodological or meta-
theoretical terms can help us to identify where the new classicals placed the centre 
of their interest. Here and now we have to focus on the most important details, but 
it would be enough to count how many times Lucas used the word “understand” 
with respect to the purposes attributed to theoretical models. One may have diffi-
culties in separating realism and instrumentalism as far as Lucas’ methodology is 
concerned. In the context of economic models, he likes using the words “mimic” 
REALISM IN ECONOMICS 275
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
and “imitation”, which are often regarded as manifestations of instrumentalism 
– though, as we have seen, the ambition to understand can hardly be compatible 
with instrumentalism. In one instance, Lucas (1980: 701) clarified what these 
words mean to him. They refer to the possibility of econometrically estimating 
the parameters of a model built from stochastically disturbed difference equa-
tions. This reasoning is a far cry from being an argument for instrumentalism. 
Actually, this manifesto is in accordance with both realism and instrumentalism, 
and only the strategy through which the economist builds up his model subjected 
to parameter estimation is decisive. The reference to empirical performance is not 
enough for us to sensibly talk about Lucas’ instrumentalism.14 
Lucas’ phrasing is occasionally confusing. In order to carry out a careful analy-
sis, it is necessary for us to recall the details about the relationship between mod-
els and reality, or the empirical performance of realist economic models outlined 
above. It is illuminating how Lucas (1977) comments on the difference between 
pre-Keynesian economics and Keynes’ theory. While pre-Keynesians had the 
ambition to explain the macro-cycles, Keynes directed his interest to the under-
standing of the institutional sources of macroeconomic instability. This shift of 
interest was subtle, but essential. While neoclassicals looked for the sources of 
business cycles within the structural elements of macro-systems, Keynes , with 
the hope and explicit intention of practical application, made efforts to identi-
fy the institutional factors affecting stability (Rutherford 1997). In this respect, 
Keynesians may have been fundamentally wrong when attributing a world view 
to the neoclassical-monetarist wing, according to which general equilibrium was 
believed to be the rule rather than the exception – even if Lucas himself did not 
believe the capitalist economy to have predestined crisis tendencies. Eventually, 
both groups searched for the causes of business cycles, but one among the struc-
tural/core factors, the other among the institutional items. However, this is only 
of secondary importance now. 
The critique Lucas (1977: 12) voiced about Keynes is more important than the 
hints above. For Lucas, the rigid nominal prices invented by Keynes are only an 
unexplained postulate, by which Keynes could transform an otherwise neoclas-
sical model into a system whose outputs were consistent with time series data. 
Here, Lucas sharply broke away from the instrumentalist methodology of F53, 
since he disapproved of the way Keynes, by applying an allegedly dubious (i.e. 
ungrounded) assumption, could obtain a model with a better empirical perform-
14  Although one may disagree with me, I have a tendency to regard empirically estimatable eco-
nomic models mentioned in the self-definitions of econometrics as economic models in the 
literal sense. One of the consequences of the present reasoning is that recognising correlations, 
however strong they are, is not the same as giving theoretical explanations. 
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ance. For hard-core new classicals, Keynes was not an economist on the grounds 
that he dropped the neoclassical microfoundations (Sargent 1977; Lucas – Sar-
gent 1978). Of course, Keynes can hardly be said to have been an instrumenta-
list. He had a well-defined and well-elaborated theory, but this theory could not 
meet the requirements set by the new classicals. It is problematic whether Lucas 
is right or wrong here,15 but the point is that for Lucas, presumptions should be 
grounded. They require explanation. This is the most important methodological 
statement as far as our current purposes are considered.
Lucas depicted mainstream economics as a law-seeking discipline. Under-
standing business cycles means the revelation of the mechanisms that are the 
common elements of all decentralised market economies. In other words, busi-
ness cycles (as far as the years after the 1930s are considered) are essentially alike 
(Lucas 1977: 10, 1980: 698–706), though they naturally have individual features, 
too. Presuming this similarity and multiplying the sole homo oeconomicus in 
order to have a kind of society (Lucas 1977: 19–20) made it possible to introduce 
rational expectations interpreted as the combination of subjective and objective 
probabilities, since identical agents must form identical expectations of phenom-
ena with a common core. For Lucas, understanding business cycles means to 
find the unified explanation which is based on general economic laws govern-
ing market economies and on the optimising behaviour of the typical individual. 
This is how the intention of finding the microfoundations occurred (Lucas 1977: 
14). The other, also significant institutional factors are simply omitted through 
isolation. Thus, business cycles have a generalisable common core that should 
be understood. 
10. CONCLUSIONS
New classical macroeconomics, due to its purposes, was characterised above as 
a realist movement. Its followers have been making serious efforts to understand 
socio-economic reality, and in doing so, they broke away from the instrumental-
ism of F53. However, analysing the goals would not have been enough in itself. 
The reasoning above was aimed at calling attention to the role and significance 
of abstraction and idealisation in the new classical theory. I argued that new clas-
sical macro, as a realist movement, provided models that could successfully be 
15  Taking into account the fact that the rigidity of nominal prices and wages could quite easily 
be underpinned by referring to certain institutional factors, which were, of course, outside the 
structural factors Lucas studied. It does not seem to have been Keynes’ fault, since he put the 
emphasis on the institutional sources of instability, even according to Lucas. 
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subjected to econometric tests due to the specific assumptions and the develop-
ment of econometrics. So, thanks to Lucas and other hard-core new classicals, the 
traditional compromise between realism and instrumentalism as to empirical per-
formance could be overcome. As a result, we might convincingly clear new clas-
sicals of the charge of instrumentalism raised by good predictive performance.
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